Maryland Law Review
Volume 44 | Issue 1

Article 7

Revisiting the Missing Witness Inference - Quieting
the Loud Voice from the Empty Chair
Robert H. Stier Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Evidence Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert H. Stier Jr., Revisiting the Missing Witness Inference - Quieting the Loud Voice from the Empty Chair, 44 Md. L. Rev. 137 (1985)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol44/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

REVISITING THE MISSING WITNESS INFERENCE
Quieting the Loud Voice from the Empty Chair
ROBERT

H.

-

STIER, JR.*

The situation is one of the oldest and most common in trial
practice: One party fails to call a witness whose testimony evidently
could help illuminate a material issue for the jury. How should the
trial court control argument about the missing witness, and how
should it instruct the jury about the significance of the witness' absence? Typically, courts invoke a venerable but confusing doctrine
that has been subject to little critical scrutiny, despite its frequent
appearance in both civil and criminal cases. In this Article, I hope to
supply a fresh perspective on the traditional missing witness
inference.
The doctrine that has evolved over time to handle the missing
witness problem is sometimes called the "empty chair doctrine," because it holds that "a litigant's failure to produce an available witness who might be expected to testify in support of the litigant's
case, permits the factfinder to draw the inference that had the witness chair been occupied, the witness would have testified adversely
to the litigant."'
The empty chair doctrine is easier to state than to apply. Evidentiary puzzles arise from the many circumstances in which the
doctrine might be invoked. What argument should the court permit
when one of the parties to a traffic accident fails to call a relative
who was a passenger in a car or truck at the time of the collision?
Does it make a difference if the "missing witness" was in the courtroom throughout the trial? Must the court allow comment on a
plaintiff's failure to call a treating physician when that doctor has
been deposed? In a criminal case, may the prosecutor comment on
the absence of an eyewitness after the defense rests without calling
any witnesses? Is the defendant entitled to an instruction when a
* A.B. 1975, J.D. 1980, Harvard University. Mr. Stier is an associate at Piper &

Marbury, Washington, D.C.
1. State v. Jefferson, 116 R.I. 124, 139, 353 A.2d 190, 199 (1976). For another
statement of the rule, see Hoverter v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 231 Md. 608, 609, 188
A.2d 696, 697 (1963) ("[I]t is well settled that failure of a party to produce an available
witness who could testify on a material issue, if not explained, gives rise to an inference
that the testimony would be unfavorable, and is a legitimate subject of comment by
counsel in an argument to the jury.").
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police informant refuses to testify? When a defendant's friend identifies alibi witnesses, but they are not called to corroborate the
friend's account of the defendant's alibi, may the prosecutor call attention to their absence?
In their efforts to address such puzzles and determine when the
doctrine should apply, courts and commentators have focused on
one main issue: When is it appropriate to infer that the witness'
testimony would be adverse? However, an analysis of the problems
raised by use of the missing witness rule shows that this emphasis on
the propriety of the inference is misplaced. Attention should be focused instead on two more specific questions. What are the proper
limits on counsel's argument about absent witnesses? And how
should the judge instruct the jury when a material witness is not
called? By answering these specific questions, I hope to show that a
missing witness rule need not produce troublesome questions about
when and how it should be invoked. I will propose some simple
guidelines for the use of a rule, including a test for relevance and a
revised set of jury instructions. These changes would alter the
shape of the current rule, but its replacement would be fairer and
more useful.
This analysis proceeds through the following steps. First, I examine the doctrinal origins of the rule. Next, I define the current
rule and sketch some of its problems. And last, I propose changes
in the rule and examine the likely consequences of those changes.
I.

THE BIRTH OF THE MISSING WITNESS INFERENCE

The "time honored statement" 2 of the missing witness rule is
the dictum in Graves v. United States3 :
The rule even in criminal cases is that if a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce witnesses whose testi2. Pennewell v. United States, 353 F.2d 870, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
3. 150 U.S. 118 (1893). The Supreme Court discussed the missing witness inference for the first time in Graves. The case involved two men who were seen travelling by
wagon through the Indian territory in 1889. One was accompanied by his wife and two
children, while the other was the wagon-owner. The party stopped for several days at a
settlement. The wagon-owner was apparently killed during this time, but his decayed
remains were not discovered until several months after the other man was seen leaving
town with his family. Three years later, while again passing through that same settlement, the married man was captured and tried for the murder of the wagon-owner. Id.
at 119.
During the closing argument, the prosecutor mentioned that the defendant's
wife had not appeared in the courtroom, although she was known to be in town at the
time of the trial. The prosecutor argued that the wife should have appeared in the
courtroom so that government witnesses could identify her as the woman who accompa-
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mony would elucidate the transaction, the fact that he does
not do it creates the presumption that the testimony, if produced, would be unfavorable." 4
Historically, courts faced with the absence of a material witness
turned for guidance to two doctrines: the ancient Roman maxim
raising a presumption against spoliators, and the best evidence rule.
From these sources, they forged the principle that informs the
Graves rule. "The nonproduction of evidence that would naturally
have been produced by an honest and therefore fearless claimant
permits the inference that its tenor is unfavorable to the party's cause." 5
To understand how this principle was derived from these doctrinal
sources, we need to understand the sources themselves.
A.

The Best Evidence Rule and the Spoliation Doctrine

The best evidence rule is intended to insure that primary materials will be introduced to prove the content of a writing. In operation, it excludes secondary proof when primary evidence is
available, and it applies only to the content of writings or equivalent
recordings. Although the precise technical application of this rule
offers little help in dealing with the absence of a witness, the rationale behind the best evidence rule supplied guidance in shaping the
missing witness rule. Various commentators6 and judges7 have
nied the defendant through the Indian territory. Id. at 120. The case was appealed, in
part, because of the prosecutor's comments.
Although acknowledging the inference that could be drawn from a witness' absence, the Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's comment was improper because
the defendant's wife was not competent to testify for or against him, and the defendant
was under no obligation to produce his wife for identification. Id. at 121. The statement
of the rule in Graves is, however, dictum because the Court found that the wife's privilege made her an incompetent witness. The Court did note that, had the wife been
competent, "[t]he comments upon her absence would have been less objectionable." Id.
at 120.
4. Id. at 121. While this inference is mislabelled as a presumption by some courts,
it is clearly only permissive, and has long been regarded as such. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72, at 806-07 (3d ed. 1984); see also Burgess v. United States,
440 F.2d 226, 233 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1970); State v. Francis, 669 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Tenn.
1984).
5. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 285, at 192 (. Chadbourne rev. ed. 1979).
6. See, e.g., 2 W.D. EVANS, NOTES TO POTHIER 128 (1806), quoted in 2J. WIGMORE,
supra note 5, § 285, at 198:
When weaker and less satisfactory testimony is tendered in support of a fact the
nature of which will admit of elucidation from proofs of a more direct and explicit character, the same caution which rejects evidence of an inferior degree
when higher evidence might be produced will awaken suspicion; and it will reasonably be supposed that a more perfect exposition of the subject would have
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elaborated on this connection, but none presents the point so
starkly as Blackstone: "If it be found that there is any better evidence existing than is produced, the very not producing it is a presumption that it would have detected some falsehood that at present
is concealed."' Despite its confident tone, Blackstone's conclusion
isnot self-evident. One commentator has noted that Blackstone's

presumption is really a questionable construct of two presumptions,
first that there has been a deliberate concealment, and second that
the concealed fact points to some falsehood. 9
The presumption of "concealment" that derives from the best
evidence doctrine also arises by analogy to the spoliation doctrine.
The ancient maxim, Contra spoliatorem omnia praesumuntur (All things
are presumed against the destroyer), 0 was adopted by common law
jurists to apply to conduct such as personal falsification, fabrication,
manufacture, suppression, or destruction of evidence. I ' A party's
intentional efforts to keep evidence from the fact-finder or to substitute false evidence are interpreted as an implied admission of weakness in that party's case. 12 More explicitly, the inference, which
Wigmore calls "one of the simplest in human experience," proceeds
from evidence of spoliation to the conclusion that the spoliator does
to the ultimate conclusion
not believe in his case, and from there
3
that his case must not warrant belief.1
The earliest cases dealt with wills, deeds, contracts or receipts
that a party destroyed or refused to produce. These cases introlaid open deficiencies and objections which a more obscure and uncertain representation was intended to conceal.
7. See, e.g., Clifton v. United States, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 242, 247 (1846) (Nelson, J.)
(restating W.D. EVANS, supra note 6); Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N.H. & R.
Co. 161 F.2d 413, 447 (2d Cir. 1947) (citing Clifton).
8. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 1326-27 (Lewis ed. 1922). See also Alexander,
Presumptions: Their Use and Abuse, 17 Miss. L.J. 1, 14 (1945) (quoting Blackstone and
discussing the presumption behind the best evidence rule).
9. Justice Alexander phrased this criticism as follows: "[W]hat is falsehood and
what is concealed? Must one presume first that there is concealment, and upon this
erect a second presumption that some positive fact, C, exists?" Alexander, supra note 8,
at 14. Wigmore finds that the justification of the best evidence rule given by Blackstone
is spurious, and that the true justification is simply that the original is more accurate. See
2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1180, at 417-18. Despite the obvious validity of these
criticisms, the inference is commonly invoked on best evidence grounds, even in recent
cases. In some states, the inference is embodied in statutes setting forth rules for preMONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-602(5),(6) (1983); see also Clark v. Hilde
sumptions. See, e.g.,
Constr. Co., 176 Mont. 164, 168, 576 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1978) (citing the statute).
10. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1257 (5th ed. 1979).
11. See 2J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 278, at 133-41.
12. Id. §§ 277, 278, at 133.

13. Id. § 278, at 133.
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duced a peculiar new issue: Could the presumption against the destroyer be taken as evidence about the content of the missing
document? Courts generally responded affirmatively, reasoning
that the destroyer should be punished for his wrongdoing by a presumption which served as affirmative proof of the evidence he had
destroyed.1 4 While some commentators disagreed with the propriety of this inference, 1 5 courts invoked it nevertheless.' 6 Wigmore,
among others, approved of this use of the inference when the party
seeking to raise it first introduced evidence that the destroyed or
withheld document was the one at issue in the case.' 7 Wigmore
gave three reasons for his support: the permissive nature of the inference, the lack of any real hardship or unfairness to the party failing to introduce the document, and the need for the court to protect
its proceedings from fraud ("no one who withholds evidence can be
in any sense a fit object of clemency or protection").'" It is important to remember also that the inference developed at a time when
parties had no means of compelling their opponents to produce
documentary evidence; it supplied a necessary incentive for the parties to present a full picture of the facts. 9 Whether the document
was destroyed or simply not produced, courts permitted the factfinder to infer that the content of the evidence would have been unfavorable to the nonproducing party. 2 ° When evidence was destroyed, however, the courts were willing to permit a further
14. "[T]he law, in hatred of the spoiler, baffles the destroyer and thwarts his iniquitous purpose, by indulging a presumption which supplies the lost proof, and thus
defeats the wrongdoer by the very means he had so confidently employed to perpetuate
the wrong." Pomeroy v. Benton, 77 Mo. 64, 86 (1882). See also A.C. Becken Co. v.
Gemex Corp., 314 F.2d 839, 841 (5th Cir. 1963) (law well settled that when records are
destroyed they may be presumed unfavorable); Maguire & Vincent, Admissions Implied
from Spoliation or Related Conduct, 45 YALE LJ. 226, 241 (1936) (quoting Pomeroy and discussing the justification for the spoliation doctrine).
15. See, e.g., W.D. EVANS, supra note 6, at 145, quoted in 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5,
§ 291, at 227.
16. See, e.g., Gemex, 314 F.2d at 841 (destruction of records is admission they were
damaging); In re Herman, 207 F. 594, 597 (N.D. Iowa 1913) (destruction of letters may
be considered admission that they were unfavorable); Love v. Dilley, 64 Md. 238, 246, 4
A. 290, 291 (1885) (applying the doctrine).
17. 2J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 291, at 228.
18. Id. at 227.
19. See Maguire & Vincent, supra note 14, at 244.
20. Chief Justice Shaw's opinion in the famous Parkman murder case provides an
example of the similarity with which courts regarded nonproduction and spoliation of
evidence. In Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295 (1850), the ChiefJustice, explaining the adverse inference from the absence of evidence, immediately adds:
"To the same head may be referred all attempts on the part of the accused to suppress
evidence, to suggest false and deceptive explanations, and to cast suspicion, without just
cause, on other persons . . . ." Id. at 316.
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inference that the party believed his entire case, not just a particular
element, to be weak.
This treatment of a party's failure to produce real and documentary evidence served as the model for courts confronted with an
absent material witness. Accordingly, the inference derived from
the model follows a similar pattern: The nonproduction of a witness
indicates that the party fears what the witness would say if called,
from which the fact-finder may conclude that the content of the witness' testimony would be unfavorable to the party.
That the inference would take this particular form was certainly
not inevitable. 2 The inference is sometimes traced to one of the
earliest cases actually to deal with a witness who failed to appear,
Blatch v. Archer," which has been cited by commentators2 3 but little
examined. In that case, 24 Lord Mansfield commented: "It is certainly a maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the
21. Curiously, courts did not analogize the missing witness situation to the inference
adopted when a witness is killed before a trial. In that case, courts content themselves
with a general inference about the defendant's consciousness of guilt, rather than speculating about what that witness would have said. See, e.g., People v. Spaulding, 309 Ill.
292, 141 N.E. 196 (1923) (evidence that defendant in a murder case killed an eyewitness
deemed admissible to show consciousness of guilt).
22. 1 Cowp. 63, 98 Eng. Rep. 969 (1774). Jurists and commentators trace the roots
of the missing witness inference not to Blatch but to an earlier case, the famous case of
the chimney sweeper's jewel, a dispute over the nonproduction of real evidence. See,
e.g., Christensen v. State, 21 Md. App. 428, 429, 320 A.2d 276, 276-77 (1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 274 Md. 133, 333 A.2d 45 (1975); Pomeroy v. Benton, 77 Mo. 64 (1882); 2
J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 285, at 192, 198; Comment, Drawing an Inference from the
Failure to Produce a Knowledgeable Witness: Evidentiary and Constitutional Considerations, 61
CALIF. L. REV. 1422, 1424 n.15 (1973); 17 OKLA. L. REV. 74 (1964); 34 CORNELL L.Q.
637 (1949). The case is Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Strange 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (1722). A
chimney sweeper's boy found a jewel ring, which he took to a jeweler for appraisal.

After prying the stone from the ring, the jeweler kept the stone and returned the setting
to the sweeper's boy. The boy brought an action in trover. After finding that the boy
could maintain the action, the court directed the jury to presume the stone to be worth
the amount of the most expensive stone that could fit in the setting. Id. Note that the
court directed a presumption, not an inference.
23. See, e.g., 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 285, at 198; 34 CORNELL L.Q. 637, 638
(1949).

24. Blatch involved the following facts: By judgment of the court, A was indebted to
B. B served C, the sheriff of Essex, with a writ commanding him to take A into custody.
The sheriffs bailiff, D, was sent out, accompanied by his son, D 1 ,to seize A. After the
arrest, A escaped, and B then brought suit against the sheriff for allowing A to get away.
The critical issue was whether D was present during the arrest, which was required for
the arrest to be legal. Evidence showed that D 1 , the bailiffs son, actually made the
arrest. Although D's part in the arrest was not clear, his son was not called to clear up
the matter. The jury apparently found the arrest legal at the trial and returned an award
for B. 1 Cowp. at 63-64, 98 Eng. Rep. at 969.
On appeal, the sheriff contended that B should have called young D' to testify to
the legality of the arrest. Lord Mansfield rejected the idea after stating his maxim, since

1985]

MISSING WITNESS INFERENCE

proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in
the power of the other to have contradicted." 2 5 But this statement
of the law merely says that a jury may consider the absence of evidence when it decides a question of fact. 2 6 It leaves a great deal of
room for a variety of inferences that might be drawn from the failure
to produce a witness, and it says nothing about the content of a missing witness' testimony. In fact, Lord Mansfield states only that a
jury might alter its assessment of a witness' credibility because other
witnesses were not called or documents were not offered-nothing
more.
Although the inference need not have taken its present form, it
seems clear that courts were willing to allow an inference about the
unfavorable substance of the missing testimony for two reasons
briefly mentioned above. First, they suspected the nonproducing
party of concealing evidence, but because they could not show that
unsavory act, they punished the would-be spoliators by depriving
them of their supposed gain; 27 and second, the courts wanted to
provide parties with a general incentive to come forward with
evidence. 2 8
For these reasons, the inference of unfavorable testimony from
an absent witness became accepted as the general rule. But the
analogies to the sources used in developing the rule were imperfect,
and, as a result, the conclusion urged upon the jury was exaggerated. The potential for serious inaccuracy developed. 2 9
the bailiff's son could not be expected to testify unfavorably to his father, who was the
real party to the action. Id. at 65, 98 Eng. Rep. at 970.
The most interesting facet of the case involved another agent of the sheriff, one
Thomlinson, who was called to testify and "upon hearing his name, ran out of the Court
to avoid his being examined." Id. at 64, 98 Eng. Rep. at 969. The ChiefJustice does not
mention this event or the inferences that the jury was likely to draw from it.
25. Id. at 65, 98 Eng. Rep. at 970.
26. Even this venerable maxim has incited controversy. See, e.g., Stoecker v. Boston
& Me. R.R., 84 N.H. 377, 380, 151 A. 457, 458 (1930) ("proof must rest upon evidence
and not upon its absence").
27. Maguire and Vincent criticize this attitude as containing "an over-load of punitive fervor." Maguire & Vincent, supra note 14, at 242.
28. For a discussion of the incentive rationale, see Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CALiF. L. REV.
1011, 1022 (1978); Comment, supra note 22, at 1423.
29. The Graves case provides ample illustration of the level of doctrinal confusion
involving the adverse inference rule. When the Court adopted the adverse inference rule
in Graves, it quoted from ChiefJustice Shaw's opinion in Commonwealth v. Webster, 59
Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 316 (1850), and cited three other cases. Among these, the next
oldest case, Gordon v. People, 33 N.Y. 501 (1865), recognized the inference of unfavorable testimony; however, this may have been an extreme position that had been abandoned in New York by the time Graves arose. See Maguire & Vincent, supra note 14, at
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The Problems with the Sources

The difficulties posed by the analogies to the best evidence rule
and the spoliation doctrine arise from the nature of the testimonial
evidence that the missing witness rule addresses. The problem is
that we cannot know the content of the testimony that the absent
witness would give.
The best evidence rule provides no guidance for this problem.
It is hard to know when certain testimonial evidence is sufficiently
"superior" to other evidence to warrant an inference if the "superior" evidence is not produced. Since testimony has no existence
until it is elicited in the courtroom, one can only determine that it is
superior-and therefore worthy of an inference about its contentby speculating about its expected content. But this begs the question, which is whether to permit an inference as to the content. Perhaps superiority of evidence might be inferred from a witness'
apparent opportunity to observe the event in question. But a witness' perceptions are purely subjective; even a person who was ideally situated to see an event may offer little, if anything, of
importance for the trier of fact. Documents do not pose the same
problems under the best evidence rule. They have a physical existence, so speculation about content is less risky. Also, the order of
preference is established: An original is clearly preferred to a copy
or to testimonial evidence of a writing's contents.
The analogy to the spoliation doctrine ignores similar weaknesses. The adverse inference suggested by that doctrine is subject
to strong criticism even as it applies to spoliators,3 ° to say nothing
of those who merely fail to produce witnesses. But the inference is
even weaker as it applies to the missing witness problem for two
reasons. First, the inference is based on the assumption that a party
239 n.37. Another New York case cited in Graves, People v. Hovey, 92 N.Y. 554 (1883),
lends support to this viewpoint. There, the court permitted an inference that "the evidence of an eye-witness to a transaction would not be favorable to a party who voluntarily excluded such witness from testifying in the case." Id. at 559. There is a difference
between evidence that is "unfavorable" and evidence that is merely "not favorable."
The latter category includes evidence that neither helps nor hurts a party.
The third case relied upon in Graves, Mercer v. State, 17 Tex. Crim. 452 (1885),
concluded merely that the failure to produce a witness corroborated the testimony of a
victim. Id. at 46. The Mercer court makes no mention of inferences about the content of
testimony from a missing witness. This is not just a semantic quibble. At a time when
more moderate inferences were gaining acceptance in the very state courts upon which
it presumed to rely, the Supreme Court adopted a rule explicitly related to the presumption against spoliators. That rule has governed decisions in the federal courts ever
since. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
30. Maguire & Vincent, supra note 14, at 236-37.
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intentionally fails to produce evidence. 3 ' But such an intention is not
clear from the mere absence of evidence in court. For documents and
real evidence, the connection is fairly easy to demonstrate once
physical possession can be shown. With testimonial evidence, just
showing that a party could present the evidence involves many more
variables. Second, even if the absence of testimonial evidence is
caused by one party's intentional failure to call a witness, the decision not to call the witness may be based upon many facts besides
the party's fear that weaknesses in the case will be exposed if testimony is heard. In contrast to documentary evidence, in which the
content is relatively clear and the jury's reaction to the evidence
might be predicted, the substance of a witness' testimony is uncertain. The extent of the evidence adduced will depend upon both
direct and cross-examinations. Also, the nature of the evidencethe testimony's phrasing, intonation, clarity, and persuasivenessand the credibility of the source, are unknown in advance. Because
there are always risks involved in presenting testimonial evidence,
the decision to call a particular witness will reflect a consideration of
these risks, as well as a party's beliefs about the weaknesses in his
case. The same risks are not involved in presenting real or documentary materials. In sum, the negative inference about the unfavorable content of missing evidence is less well suited to testimony
than to chattel or documents. But despite the inaccurate fit between
the inference raised by the missing witness rule and its doctrinal
sources, the rule of Graves has become a standard piece of evidentiary ammunition. To understand the problems that use of this rule
has created, I will now describe more fully the current form of the
traditional inference.
II.

THE TRADITIONAL INFERENCE:
32
MYSTERY AND MUMBO-JUMBO?

One characteristic is cited far more than all others as a rationale
31. See, e.g., Love v. Dilley, 64 Md. 238, 243-44, 4 A. 290, 291-92 (1885) (court notes
that witness was likely person to have possession of notes, that notes were destroyed,
and finds that notes must have been intentionally suppressed or destroyed).
32. In UAW v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1972), Judge Wright
concluded that the missing witness rule (which he refers to as the "adverse witness
[Ilt is more a
rule") "is disappointingly free of mystery and mumbo-jumbo .....
product of common sense than of the common law." He acknowledged, however, that
"the unwary [might] conclude that the adverse inference rule is one of those intricate
gems of the common law which is riddled with nonsensical exceptions, encrusted with
gloss upon gloss, and surrounded by an arcane lore last fully explicated in a threevolume treatise published in the late 19th century." Id.
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for the inference based on the absence of a witness-its naturalness. 33 The rule seems intended to respond to jurors' common
' 34
sense notions, by allowing them to draw "the natural conclusion
from a party's failure to explain or contradict harmful evidence.
Yet, in their attempt to explain when the inference is natural, the
courts have produced a set of guidelines that are extraordinary for
their unnatural complexity, their ability to confuse, and their potential for abuse. Faced with this bewildering hodgepodge, one eminent jurist was moved to sigh: "[1L]egal presumptions involve subtle
conceptions to which not even judges always bring clear understanding." 3 5 Little more need be said to evoke well-deserved sympathy for the poor jurors; after all, it is they who must find their way
through "an area fraught with even more difficulties for laymen than
for lawyers ' 36 to arrive at their "natural" conclusion. The rule of
Graves seems clear enough: If a party having the power to produce
witnesses whose testimony would clarify issues at hand does not call
them, a presumption is created that their testimony would have
been unfavorable. 37 But if the rule initially seems clear, it is partly
because of all that it fails to say. The Graves rule outlines when the
inference is permitted, but it provides little guidance to counsel concerning the proper scope of argument about the inference, and no
more help to judges who need to know when and how to instruct
jurors on the subject of the missing witness. And even in its main
focus, namely the circumstances in which the inference will be permitted, the rule is vague and perplexing; for example, there is widespread confusion over the meaning of the concept of a party having
the "power" to call a witness. 8
Without the benefit of a lucid rule to guide them, trial judges
nevertheless have been forced to set the limits of argument and to
translate their understandings into instructions. An appellate judge
33. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 285, at 192; see also Burgess v. United States, 440
F.2d 226, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Robinson, J., concurring); Wheatley v. State, 465 A.2d
1110, 1111 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984).
34. Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 316 (1850).
35. Richards v. United States, 275 F.2d 655, 661 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting) (citing Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614 (1945)), cert. denied,
363 U.S. 815 (1960). Judge Bazelon is by no means alone. Other disparaging remarks
about the rule can be found in Reehil v. Fraas, 129 A.D. 563, 567, 114 N.Y.S. 17, 20
(1908) ("[Olne may well be bewildered, owing to the collection of crude, inadvertent
and contradictory material.").
36. United States v. Young, 463 F.2d 934, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Robinson, J.,
concurring).
37. Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893).
38. See Richards, 275 F.2d at 660 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
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explained what has happened to the missing witness rule in the process: "Numerous American courts-this court included-have
struggled in a vast multitude of lawsuits to separate the types of situations wherein the witness's absence has real significance from those
in which it does not."' 39 As an inevitable result of these Herculean
efforts, the simple concepts of the Graves rule have been transformed into what that judge has described as a "fairly complex body
of rules" composed of "leading principles" and "a bundle of subsidiary rules." 4 It remains to be seen whether, in the course of this
development, any real elucidation has taken place.
In its full glory, the current incarnation of the missing witness
rule looks something like this:
42
4
If according to the appropriateprocedures, the court is shown
that:
(1) a witness is available, i.e., an identifiable witness may be
located, is competent to testify, and is neither incapacitated nor outside the jurisdiction of the court,43
(2) to one of the parties alone (majority view), 44 because only
one of the parties has physical access to the witness
(and in some jurisdictions, also, because the opposing
party could not be expected to call the witness, who

39. Young, 463 F.2d at 946 (Robinson, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 946-47.
41. The court may require a party to obtain permission in advance before allowing
that party to comment on the absence of a witness during argument. See, e.g., United
States v. Martin, 696 F.2d 49, 52 (6th Cir. 1983) (the party intending to invoke the
inference must obtain an advance ruling from the trial court). Also, the court may offer
the opposing party an opportunity to explain a witness' absence out of the jury's presence. See, e.g., Christensen v. State, 274 Md. 133, 135, 333 A.2d 45, 46 (1975); State v.
Clawans, 38 N.J. 162, 172, 183 A.2d 77, 82 (1962). Both Christensen and Clawans note a
preference for such a procedure, yet neither holds it mandatory.
42. The standard of proof and allocation of the burden for this issue are not clear.
See generally Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey of Limitations on the Prosecutor'sClosing Argument, 64J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 47 (1973) (presenting the disparate views on this
issue).
43. See State v. Francis, 669 S.W.2d 85, 88 n.3 (Tenn. 1984) (inference not appropriate if witness unavailable); 2J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 286, at 199-200; see also Nichols
v. Coppola Motors, 178 Conn. 335, 342, 422 A.2d 260, 264 (1979) (availability may be
shown from relationship to party as well as from physicial presence or accessibility); cf.
New England Whalers Hockey Club v. Nair, 1 Conn. App. 680, 474 A.2d 810, 812
(1984) (burden of showing availability is on party seeking benefit of inference).
44. Most jurisdictions hold that the inference is not allowed when the witness is
available to both sides. See, e.g., Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine v. George A.
Fuller Co., 719 F.2d 1335, 1353 (7th Cir. 1983); Yuen v. State, 43 Md. App. 109, 112,
403 A.2d 819, 822 (1978); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hassinger, 473 A.2d 171, 175
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
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appears prejudiced or hostile46to the opposition),4 5 or
to either party (minority view);

(3)

(4)

and the anticipated testimony of the witness would elucidate
some material issue, in that the testimony is neither excludable on evidentiary grounds, nor privileged (unless the affected party is able 48to waive the privilege),4 7
nor cumulative, nor inferior;
and the party who fails to produce the witness offers no
explanation,41

(5)

then the fact-finder may be permitted, but is not required,50 to
infer that the testimony would have been unfavorable to the
party who failed to call the witness,,5 however, that inference
does not supply affirmative or substantive proof but merely affects the weight or credibility of the evidence.5 2

45. See, e.g., Tonarelli v. Gibbons, 121 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 460 N.E.2d 464, 468 (1984)
(witness not equally available to a party if likelihood exists that he would be biased
against that party); see also 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 287, at 202.
46. See generally 2J. Wigmore, supra note 5, §288, at 204-09. Wigmore argues for the
minority rule that when the absent witness is equally available to both parties, they both
are vulnerable to the adverse inference. Id.
47. See, e.g., Wheatley v. State, 465 A.2d 1110, 1111 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983) (inference
not proper because witness, an informer, was privileged and did not waive privilege); see
also 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 286, at 201-02. The law is in a state of flux in its
treatment of privileges, particularly between husband and wife. See Annot., 5 A.L.R.2D
886 (1949). Also, in many jurisdictions, including Maryland, the absence of an accomplice will not give rise to an adverse inference because the accomplice presumably would
assert his privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Christensen v. State, 274 Md.
133, 140-41, 333 A.2d 45, 49 (1975).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Warwick, 695 F.2d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 1982) (negative
inference may not be drawn when testimony would be cumulative); accord Barnett v.
Equality Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 662 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Mo. App. 1983); cf Arie v. Intertherm, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142, 155 (Mo. App. 1983) (party attempting to argue inference must show witness had knowledge of pertinent facts).
49. See Hageny v. United States, 570 F.2d 924, 936 (Ct. Cl. 1978); 2 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 5, § 290, at 216; see also United States v. McCaskill, 481 F.2d 855, 857 (8th Cir.
1973) (citing Wigmore). A party may not merely offer an explanation in argument, since
the attorney would then be relating facts not in evidence. See United States v. Latimer,
511 F.2d 498, 503 n.7 (10th Cir. 1975) ("The nonproduction of evidence which a party
would normally be expected to produce may be explained by the testimony of other
witnesses, properly sworn and subject to cross-examination, or by the introduction of
other evidence at trial."). For two examples of instances where prosecutors offered improper explanations, see State v. Thomas, 305 Minn. 513, 515-16, 232 N.W.2d 766,
767-68 (1975); State v. Shupe, 293 Minn. 395, 196 N.W.2d 127 (1972).
50. See Conlin v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 120 R.I. 1, 6 n.3, 384 A.2d 1057, 1060 n.3
(1978). The permissive nature of the inference confuses some judges as well as juries.
In United States v. Tucker, 552 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1977), the government failed to produce an informant in a bench trial. The judge erroneously reassured the defense counsel: "You are entitled for me to assume that the confidential informant if he is not called
would testify favorably to your client ....
" Id. at 207.
51. 2J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §§ 285, 290.
52. See Conlin v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 120 R.I. 1, 7, 384 A.2d 1057, 1060 (1978)
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In most jurisdictions, 3 counsel for the defendant or the plain(effect of inference is merely to impair value of party's proof and to give greater credibility to opposing party's direct evidence on the issue); see also 2J. WIGMORE, supra note 5,
§ 290, at 218-19. The fact that the inference will not supply substantive proof should
never concern the jury; it is important only for the judge's decision on a motion for a
directed verdict. See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW,
§§ 2485-88, at 185-300 U. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (discussing burden of proof).
53. The inference can be found in some form in almost every jurisdiction, most frequently in civil cases. See, e.g., Alabama, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Larisey, 269 Ala.
203, 207-08, 112 So. 2d 203, 207 (1959); Alaska, Grimes v. Haslett, 641 P.2d 813, 821
(Alaska 1982); Arizona, Ponce v. Industrial Comm'n, 120 Ariz. 134, 136, 584 P.2d 598,
600 (1978); Arkansas, Canal Ins. Co. v. Hall, 259 Ark. 797, 800, 536 S.W.2d 702, 703-04
(1976); California, Newman v. Bishop, 59 Cal. App. 3d 451, 480-81, 130 Cal. Rptr. 786,
806-07 (1976); Colorado, Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Rinn, 100 Colo. 76, 81, 65
P.2d 705, 707 (1957); Connecticut, Kelsey v. Connecticut State Employee's Ass'n, 179
Conn. 606, 616, 427 A.2d 420, 425 (1980); Florida, Alter v. Finesmith, 214 So. 2d 732,
737 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), cert. denied, 225 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1969); Georgia, Maloy v.
Dixon, 127 Ga. App. 151, 160-61, 193 S.E.2d 19, 26 (1972) (citing GA. CODE § 38-119
(1933), current version at GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-22 (1982)); Illinois, Tonarelli v. Gibbons, 121 IlI. App. 3d 1042, 460 N.E.2d 464, 468 (1984); Indiana, Breese v. State, 449
N.E.2d 1098, 1106 (Ind. App. 1983); Iowa, Crosser v. Iowa Dep't of Public Safety, 240
N.W.2d 682, 685 (Iowa 1976); Kansas, Londerholm v. Unified School Dist. No. 500, 199
Kan. 312, 314, 430 P.2d 188, 197 (1967); Kentucky, Electronic Sales Eng'rs, Inc. v. Urban Renewal & Community Dev. Agency, 477 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Ky. 1972); Maryland,
Hoverter v. Director of Patuxent Inst., 231 Md. 608, 609, 188 A.2d 696, 697 (1963);
Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. United Food Corp., 374 Mass. 765, 771-72, 374
N.E.2d 1331, 1338 (1978); Michigan, Bugariu v. Bugariu, 8 Mich. App. 673, 677, 155
N.W.2d 244, 246 (1967); Minnesota, Addison v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 493,
496-97, 238 N.W.2d 885, 888 (1976) (per curiam); Mississippi, Fruehauf Corp. v. Trustees of First United Methodist Church, 387 So. 2d 106, 112 (Miss. 1980); Nevada, Maitia
v. Allied Land & Live Stock Co., 49 Nev. 451, 471, 248 P. 893, 899 (1926); New Hampshire, Ober v. Curnane, 95 N.H. 29, 30, 56 A.2d 923, 924 (1948) (by implication); New
Jersey, Yacker v. Weiner, 109 N.J. Super. 351, 361, 263 A.2d 188, 193 (1970); New
Mexico, Douglas v. Mutual Beneficial Health & Accident Ass'n, 42 N.M. 190, 200, 76
P.2d 453, 459 (1937); North Carolina, Maxwell v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 204
N.C. 309, 316, 168 S.E.2d 403, 404 (1933); North Dakota, Sero, Inc. v. Gauvey Rig &
Trucking Co., 166 N.W.2d 397, 403 (N.D. 1969); Ohio, Silveous v. Rensch, 20 Ohio St.
2d 82, 84, 253 N.E.2d 758, 759-60 (1969); Oklahoma, In re Estate of Lacy v. Mielke, 431
P.2d 366, 369 (Okla. 1967); Oregon, Bohle v. Matson Navigation Co., 243 Or. 196, 198,
412 P.2d 367, 368 (1966); Rhode Island, Conlin v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 120 R.I. 1, 6,
384 A.2d 1057, 1060 (1978); South Carolina, Arnold v. Yarborough, 316 S.E.2d 416,
418 (S. C. App. 1984); South Dakota, City of Rapid City v. Brown, 252 N.W.2d 323, 325
(S.D. 1977); Tennessee, Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57 Tenn. App. 106,
114, 415 S.W.2d 347, 351 (1966); Texas, Baker v. Lockheed Aircraft Serv. Co., 584
S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Vermont, Choiniere v. Sulikowski, 126 Vt. 274,
279, 229 A.2d 305, 309 (1967); Virginia, Williams v. Vaughan, 214 Va. 304, 310, 199
S.E.2d 515, 577 (1973); Washington, Rognrust v. Seto, 2 Wash. App. 215, 220-21, 467
P.2d 204, 208 (1970); West Virginia, Evans v. State Compensation Director, 150 W. Va.
161, 166-67, 144 S.E.2d 663, 667 (1965); Wisconsin, Ex rel. Park Plaza Shopping Center,
Inc. v. O'Malley, 59 Wis. 2d 217, 218, 207 N.W.2d 622, 623 (1973); Wyoming, Marbel v.
Pursel, 65 Wyo. 395, 409, 202 P.2d 656, 660-61 (1949).
In Minnesota and Rhode Island, the inference may not be invoked by prosecutors in criminal trials. See infra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
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tiff/prosecution (where a prima facie case is shown)5 4 will then be
permitted (or entitled) 55 during argument to the jury5 6 to comment
on the absence of a witness 57 and may also be permitted to draw the
inference of unfavorable testimony,5 8 so long as the comments do
not direct the jury's attention to a criminal defendant's own failure
to testify. 5 9 If the inference is permitted, the court is allowed (or
required)60 to instruct the jury about the nature of the inference. 6 '
Professor McCormick feared that the courts' attempts to im54. See Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 316 (1850).
55. See, e.g., Feese v. Anderson, 48 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Mo. App. 1983) (failure to call
witness who appears to be knowledgeable and is not equally available entitles counsel
for opposing party to comment on that failure). It is not clear to what extent a trial
judge may prohibit comment by counsel if the conditions for the inference are satisfied.
See, e.g., Burgess v. United States, 440 F.2d 226, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Fahy, J., suggests
that defense counsel is entitled to comment but not to draw adverse inference). This
question is perhaps little explored because it arises on appeal only where the defendant
claims that he was prejudiced by a ruling preventing such comment. Such cases are rare.
See also United States v. Young, 463 F.2d 934, 944 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (judge has
discretion to preclude comment if it would exert a disproportionate burden on the trial).
56. In those jurisdictions in which a defendant's argument is sandwiched between
the plaintiff/prosecutor's closing argument and his rebuttal, the plaintiff/prosecutor
may be required to comment on absent defense witnesses in the closing argument rather
than in the rebuttal. This would at least permit the defendant to reply to that comment
and prevent the plaintiff/prosecutor from saving his ammunition for rebuttal.
57. The court may also permit the plaintiff/prosecutor to comment on a missing
witness, regardless of the propriety of the inference in other situations, if that comment
responds to defense counsel's improper questions or argument. See Vess, supra note 42,
at 47.
58. Judge Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit noted the confusing distinction created by
Judge Fahy in Burgess, 440 F.2d at 235, which would allow counsel to comment on a
witness' absence so long as the adverse inference is not mentioned. See Young, 463 F.2d
at 943 n.16. Judge Leventhal observed that any comment on an absent witness is, in
fact, an invitation to the jury to draw the inference. Id. See also Vess, supra note 42, at 47
(noting the danger in allowing the prosecutor to argue for the adverse inference).
59. Comments that "naturally and necessarily" focus the jurors' attention on a defendant's failure to take the stand violate the rule of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
613 (1965)(comment on defendant's failure to testify violates fifth amendment). The
courts' lax application of the Griffin standard is criticized in Comment, supra note 22, at
1430-34; Annot., 14 A.L.R.3D 723 (1967).
60. Whether the instruction is mandatory remains an issue for debate. This issue is
thoughtfully examined in the opinions by Judges Fahy and Robinson in Burgess, 440 F.2d
at 234, 237. Judge Fahy contends that the judge must have discretion over when to
instruct, id. at 234, while Judge Robinson, in his concurring opinion, argues that once
the conditions are fulfilled, the judge cannot deny a request for the instruction, id. at
237. See also Young, 463 F.2d at 944, 949 (Judges Leventhal and Robinson disagreeing
over this same issue).
61. The pattern instruction for the federal courts reads:
If it is peculiarly within the power of either the prosecution or the defendant to
produce a witness who could give material testimony on an issue in the case,
failure to call the witness may give rise to an inference that his testimony would
be unfavorable to that party. However, no such conclusion should be drawn by
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pose strict control over argument and instructions about absent witnesses would result in their "spinning a web of rules;"' 6 2 after this
brief look at the current state of the rule, his apprehension seems
totally justified. As this restatement of the rule indicates, courts
have reacted to the rule's potential inaccuracy and unfairness by decreasing the number of situations in which the adverse inference
might be applied, and by erecting procedural barriers for counsel to
surmount before the substantive propriety of the inference will even
be considered.6" Some courts require counsel to obtain an advance
ruling on their intended comment or proposed instructions, which
enables the court to develop a record that shows whether or not the
rule was satisfied.6 4
There are several reasons for these procedural safeguards.
First, although trial judges may apply the rule incorrectly in the heat
of trial, 65 appellate judges are very reluctant to reverse a criminal
conviction simply because counsel improperly referred to a missing
witness.6 6 And second, the courts expressed concern that a nonproducing party would be unjustly surprised by an opponent's request for a missing witness instruction, particularly when such a reyou with regard to a witness who is equally available to both parties, or where
the witness's testimony would be merely cumulative.
The jury will always bear in mind that the law never imposes on a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witness or producing any evidence.
1 E. DEVrrr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 17.19, at 56566 (3d ed. 1977); compare Young, 463 F.2d at 944 app. (Judge Leventhal's specimen instruction on absent witnesses); Richards v. United States, 275 F.2d 665, 659 (D.C. Cir.
1960) (Bazelon, J., dissenting) (stating trial judges' instruction on evidentiary significance of a missing witness).
62. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 272, at 807.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 696 F.2d 49, 52 (6th Cir. 1983) (government
must obtain advance ruling on permissibility of missing witness inference); United State
v. Beeler, 587 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir. 1978) (rule in Sixth Circuit is that counsel must
obtain advance ruling on permissibility of arguing adverse inference), affd after remand,
648 F.2d 1103, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981); Gass v. United States, 416 F.2d 767, 775
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (counsel must obtain advance ruling).
64. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 444 A.2d 962, 963-64 (D.C. App. 1982)
("[D]angers inherent in allowing the jury to draw an adverse inference from the absence
of evidence require the trial court to make an advance factual determination (1) that the
witness is peculiarly within the power of the party to produce, and (2) that the witness'
testimony is likely to elucidate the transaction at issue."); Dyson v. United States, 418
A.2d 127, 131 (D.C. App. 1980) (court must make finding that conditions creating foundation for inference exist).
65. See, e.g., Gass v. United States, 416 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (prosecutor argued
the inference, defense counsel failed to object, and judge gave no instructions about
inference).
66. Cf id. at 775.
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quest would afford the surprised party no chance to explain to the
jury any legitimate reasons for the failure to produce a witness. 6 7
As judicial supervision over comment and instruction increases,
McCormick's concerns for the waste ofjudicial resources seem justified. 68 At least one commentator has proposed a reformulation of
the rule, in an effort to dispense with the qualifications and exceptions to the rule that have arisen in its application by the courts:
Where a litigant fails, without satisfactory explanation, to
call an available material witness when under the circumstances of the case, the reasonable litigant would do so, an
unfavorable but rebuttable inference of fact may be drawn
against such party, in which the evidence offered is to be
most strongly construed against him.6 9
This proposal is a step in the right direction, for reasons that will be
discussed shortly; but ultimately, it remains unsatisfactory. The
70
"flexible, general terms" are just so many vague "weasel words."
There is no attempt to explain what constitutes a "satisfactory explanation" for a witness' absence, or even what is an "available material witness." In light of the elaborate development of the current
rule, it is easy to imagine what fun the courts would have giving
meaning to such terms. Instead of more simple and direct language, we are left, ultimately, with new jargon such as "unfavorable
but rebuttable inference of fact."
The problems with the Graves rule are not limited to judicial
difficulties in administering the rule; use of the rule in its current
form also permits jurors to engage in unwarranted speculation. 7 '
67. See, e.g., State v. Clawans, 38 N.J. 162, 172, 183 A.2d 77, 82 (1962) (better practice is to advise trial judge and counsel of intention to ask for instruction on missing
witness inference so that party accused of nonproduction may have chance to respond);
see also Christensen v. State, 279 Md. 133, 137 n.l, 333 A.2d 45, 46 n.l (1975) (quoting
Clawans' reasoning).

68. Other commentators echo his view. One perceptive critic noted: "In very few
cases would the evidentiary value of the inference, which could only strengthen or
weaken other affirmative proof, justify the necessary expenditure of judicial time."
Comment, supra note 22, at 1429.
69. 34 CORNELL L.Q. 637, 642 (1949). This commentator indicated that such a rule
would need to be applied on an ad hoc basis, according to all the facts and circumstances, and would yield no "satisfactory precedents." Id.
70. Maguire & Vincent, supra note 14, at 239.
71. In People v. Taylor, 98 Misc. 2d 163, 413 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1979), the court rejected
the following instruction, deeming it "pure and unadulterated speculation": "The failure of the People to produce the confidential informant as a witness or to explain his
absence can permit the jury to infer that whatever testimony the confidential informant
had to offer would be detrimental to the prosecution's position." Id. at 169, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 576. Instead, the court approved this charge:
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The inference, say its critics, is not so "natural" after all. Rather, it
allows misleading and inaccurate results. 7 2 The rule depends on the
notion that a witness is missing because the party who might be expected to have called the witness fears that the testimony will be
harmful. But there are many reasons having nothing to do with the
content of the witness' testimony-one critic labels these "tactical
choices and personal sensibilities"-that might prevent a party from
calling a witness.7"
In reply, proponents of the missing witness rule point out, first,
that this is only one of many situations when we want to call the
jury's attention to a circumstance that they might otherwise have
overlooked or undervalued, in this instance, the absence of the witness."4 Second, the qualifications on the use of the rule are intended to limit its application to those situations in which the
inference has a basis in fact and the jury has less room for speculation. And third, the rule only allows a permissive inference and it
recognizes the many possible reasons for a witness' absence by allowing the jury to assign its own weight to this fact, according to the
circumstances. Still, the possibility of an inaccurate inference leaves
courts notably reluctant to assign much weight to the absence of a
witness, and at least one court has gone so far as to prohibit such
comment in criminal trials.7 5
In addition, members of the jury, you have heard some evidence concerning
the presence of another person-a confidential informant-during the alleged
sale of heroin by the defendant to the undercover police officer. If you find that
such person was in a position to give relevant evidence as to some material fact
or facts in issue, then you may infer-from the failure of the People to call such
person as a witness or to explain his absence-if you deem it proper to do so,
you may infer that the testimony of such person would not support the evidence adduced by the People as to such material fact or facts.
Id.

72. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 444 A.2d 962, 964 n.2 (D.C. 1982) (inference
is dangerous because it adds fictitious weight to one side of case).
73. Comment, supra note 22, at 1427. A party may decide not to call a witness because the witness has a criminal record which could be used for impeachment, the witness is too unpredictable or untrustworthy, or the witness' personal appearance will
create an adverse impression on the jurors. A party's personal sensibilities may require
him to shield family members from sensationalism, to avoid placing a witness in a stressful situation, or to protect himself from having personal secrets elicited at trial. Also, a
witness may refuse to testify as a political protest against the system. Id. See also United
States v. Busic, 587 F.2d 577, 586 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 964 (1978).
74. For a discussion of man's psychological propensity to ignore the "nonoccurrences of potential events," see R. NIsBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES
AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 48 (1980).
75. See, e.g., State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 218 N.W.2d 197 (1974) (per curiam). See
also infra text accompanying notes 108-13.
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While most courts accept the rule despite these problems,
courts are obviously troubled by its potential for inaccurate results,
particularly in the criminal context. Indeed, courts concerned with
the accuracy of the inference often respond by denying a request for
a missing witness instruction altogether in one typical situationwhen the prosecution fails to call an informant.
When a material witness who is obviously in the government's
control does not appear, trial courts often try to justify a decision
that will keep the jury from drawing the adverse inference. Sometimes, the court will attempt to rationalize that decision by appealing to the fuzzy particulars of the Graves rule, as in United States v.
Long.7 6 There, the trial judge examined the informant in camera, determined for himself that the testimony was "corroborative and cumulative," sustained an objection to defense counsel's comment
that "the government saw fit not to produce [the informant]," and
instructed the jury that the witness was absent by his order!7 7
At other times, the court may fall back on its asserted discretionary authority when it denies a missing witness instruction. In
Burgess v. United States,7" the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
rejected an argument that the testimony of a narcotics informant
would have been cumulative, but nevertheless upheld the trial
court's refusal to give the missing witness instruction. Discussing
the Graves rule, the court explained that
the Supreme Court in Graves did not deprive trial courts of
considerable latitude in applying the rule, guided by the
importance of the possible witness to a fair elucidation of
the facts as well as by a rational interpretation of when a
party has the power to produce him. Not every absent but
producible witness who can be held to have some knowlof Graves be made the subedge of the facts need by reason
79
ject of the "presumption.
Of course, the question remains: When should judges grant a requested instruction? In Burgess, Judge Fahy8 ° proposed simply that
76. 533 F.2d 505 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976).
77. Id. at 509. See also United States v. Hines, 470 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1972) (When
one eyewitness, whose testimony would have been inferior to that given by other eyewitness, was not called by the government, no adverse inference was warranted, because
the absent witness' testimony would only have been cumulative.), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
968 (1973).
78. 440 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
79. Id. at 233.
80. Each judge on the Burgess panel expressed a different understanding of the rule
and its application under the facts presented.
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8
the decision be left to judicial discretion. 1
At least Judge Fahy is honest about the extent to which the instruction derived from the Graves rule may become, in actuality, a
judge's ad hoc comment on the evidence. Nevertheless, our admiration for his forthrightness should not obscure the fact that he has
still chopped down a jurisprudential cherry tree. A judge invades
the jury's province if he uses his discretionary power as a tool to
shape their decisions as he sees fit.82 And this interpretation of the
Graves rule is especially disturbing because trial courts often apply a
double standard to prosecution and defense witnesses in criminal
trials. In fairness, the same rule, with the same potential for inaccuracy, ought to apply to any missing witness, whether an alibi witness
for the defense or an informant for the prosecution.
The missing witness rule not only affords judges an opportunity
to exercise discretionary power; it also invites abuse by counsel.
Too often the rule is treated as just another weapon available for the
duel between the lawyers. Counsel invoke the inference of adverse
testimony without any concern for the actual content of the evidence and sometimes even urge an inference known to be false just
to gain an advantage.8 3 Blakemore v. United States8 4 and Burgess v.
United States 85 illustrate the problem well.
In Blakemore the defendant was charged with possession of a
sawed-off shotgun. Although the defense counsel submitted the
names of six potential witnesses to the judge to be used for the voir
dire, at trial, the defense called only one witness. The judge permitted the prosecutor to argue the inference that the testimony of the
missing defense witnesses would have been unfavorable to the defendant. The judge agreed with the prosecutor that the defendant

81. "When thus an instruction is sought which in a sense creates evidence from the
absence of evidence, the court is entitled to reserve to itself the right to reach a judgment as wisely as can be done in all of the circumstances, even when the general guidelines based upon Graves are found to be supported by the evidence." Burgess, 440 F.2d
at 234. judge Fahy added a comment in the footnote indicating that, because of differing factual circumstances, no precise guidelines could be developed. Id. at 234 n. 11.
82. The most blatant abuse of the missing witness inference occurs when judges suggest sua sponte that an instruction be requested. Such action is considered improper,
but may not require a new trial. See Brown v. United States, 414 F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (per curiam); Egan v. United States, 287 F. 958, 969-70 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Dailey, 524 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1975) (prosecutor argued
for the adverse inference although he knew that absent witness' testimony would not be
unfavorable to defendant). In the criminal context, such behavior is clearly prohibited
according to the ABA Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice: The
Prosecution Function § 5.8(a) and The Defense Function § 7.8(a).
84. 489 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1973).
85. 440 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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had tried to use a long list of witnesses for voir dire to suggest he
had more support for his defense than he actually had, and the
judge allowed the prosecutor to argue that it was only fair, if the
defendant failed to call those witnesses, to restore the balance of
advantages by penalizing the defense with an unfavorable
inference. s6
In Burgess, the defense counsel asked for a missing witness instruction after the prosecutor failed to call an informant. Although
the informant was available to the defense, defense counsel did not
call him. The concurring opinion noted wryly:
Counsel carefully refrained from urging strenuously that
the witness be produced; his cry for help was so muted as
to be almost inaudible. I think it is a fair inference that
counsel did not want the witness but hoped to take advantage of a missing witness instruction, or claim of error if the
instruction was refused.8 7
This transformation of the missing witness instruction into a
tactical weapon should not be surprising, considering the nature of
the allowable inference. Counsel are offered the opportunity to
speculate, with the court's blessings, about the content of testimony
from a witness who will never face an attorney's cross-examination
or the jury's scrutiny. Any serious proposal to change the Graves
rule should remove this obvious temptation.
III.

CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL INFERENCE

Given the questionable logic of the rule's origins, the complexity of its current form, and the number of problems with its application, perhaps it is not surprising that, in both civil and criminal
contexts, the continuing viability of the missing witness inference
has been challenged.

86. Blakemore, 489 F.2d at 194. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding
that, although the prosecutor had asked for and received an advance ruling on the appropriateness such an argument, the trial judge erred in failing to explore the circumstances that might have made the inference inappropriate. Id. at 196. For example, the
trial judge did not inquire into whether the missing witnesses were peculiarly within the
defendant's control. Id. at 195-96. Also, the prosecution did not demonstrate that "the
anticipated testimony of the uncalled witness [would] 'elucidate the transaction.' " Id. at
196.
87. Burgess, 440 F.2d at 239. See also United States v. Williams, 496 F.2d 378, 383
(1st Cir. 1974) (finding no error in failure to give missing witness instruction where
absent government informants were equally available to both sides).
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A.

Civil Cases

Some critics, including Professor McCormick, have suggested
that the missing witness rule is unnecessary in civil cases because the
8
opportunity for discovery makes any witness "available" to a party.
Hence, no witness can be said to be peculiarly available to one party
alone. Rather than relying on an inference in an effort to establish
the content of a missing witness's testimony, a party should depose
the witness. If the party fails to avail itself of its discovery opportunities, then there should be no complaint that an adversary is withholding evidence from the finder of fact.8 9

This argument, while not without some persuasive appeal, is ultimately unsatisfactory. First, from a theoretical perspective, the
mere physical availability of a witness either for deposition or for
testimony at trial is not the critical issue; it is instead the witness'
natural propensity to favor one side over another. It is this witness'
predisposition toward one party that makes it natural for jurors to
infer that the party would be likely to produce that witness if the
witness' testimony were favorable to its case. Physical availability
alone is not enough to support the inference in most jurisdictions.9

°

Instead, there must be a known relationship between the witness
and party against whom the inference would be invoked. For example, civil cases involving the inference usually deal with missing relatives, employees, doctors, or attorneys-persons with whom the

party has a pre-existing relationship. 9

Since physical availability is

88. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 272, at 806; Comment, supra note 22, at 1424-25
n.17; see also Harper v. B&W Bandag Center, Inc., 311 S.E.2d 104, 106-07 (Va. 1984)
(Russel, J., concurring) (missing witness doctrine should be accorded "decent burial" as
discovery should be used instead).
89. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1024, 1217 (8th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974); Jenkins v. Bierschenk, 333 F.2d 421, 425 (8th
Cir. 1964) (Blackmun, J.). The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, while not endorsing this theory explicitly, has indicated that a witness' availability through discovery may
be an important consideration in determining whether an instruction is proper. Thomas
v. Owens, 28 Md. App. 442, 452, 346 A.2d 662, 668 (1975).
90. See, e.g., State v. Bennett, 171 Conn. 47, 55, 368 A.2d 184, 189 (1976) (witness
must be available and must be one whom party would naturally produce); Hertz v.
Hardy, 197 Pa. Super. 466, 473, 178 A.2d 833, 837 (1962) (rule not invoked unless
party's interest would be furthered by the production of the witness); Secondino v. New
Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672, 675, 165 A.2d 598, 600 (1960) ("Availability of the
witness is not the sole test."); cf. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Larisey, 269 Ala. 203,
207-08, 112 So. 2d 203, 207 (1959) (failure to offer an available witness whose testimony
would merely support uncontradicted testimony does not raise the presumption).
91. See, e.g., Jumonville v. Frank's Petroleum, Inc., 422 So. 2d 1261, 1262 (La. App.
1982) (failure to call son allows inference); Nakis v. Amabile, 103 11. App. 3d 840, 84647, 431 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (1981) (failure to call cousin allows inference).
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only a part of the justification for the inference, the failure to take
advantage of that availability by deposition is an incomplete argument for disallowing the inference.
Second, a more important policy-based rationale favors retaining the inference even though the absent witness could have been
deposed. The proposal to deny the inference is based upon the
contention that discovery should be used in place of the inference to
expose testimony favorable to one's position. While this has the advantage of abolishing uncertainty about the nature of a witness' testimony, it also creates incentives that are wasteful and inefficient. It
requires one party to identify those opposition witnesses who possess information that may be damaging to the other party and then
to devise a discovery strategy to uncover that information. In effect,
such a rule requires a party to depose all witnesses favoring the opposing party, in the hope of uncovering useful facts. But forcing a
party to search for beneficial evidence in unlikely places is bound to
offer a low return for the time, energy, and expense invested. It is
akin to demanding that a party prove the negative of a proposition,
and the distribution of burdens is similarly inefficient.
The traditional inference, on the other hand, automatically performs the difficult task of selecting those witnesses who may harbor
damaging information without imposing the costs of extensive discovery. They are the knowledgeable witnesses not called by the
other side. The traditional inference may not be accurate, but that
is a separate problem, which will be addressed shortly. At least the
inference focuses attention on those witnesses whose testimony is
most promising for the adverse party, without resort to a shotgun
approach to discovery.
Several other factors favor keeping some form of adverse inference in civil cases. First, a rule conditioning the inference on a witness' "non-availability" for discovery would create another issuenon-availability- that would have to be litigated to determine
whether an inference should be allowed. For example, discovery of
expert witnesses is not available as of right in most jurisdictions.
When a party fails to call an expert who has been identified but not
deposed, could the opposing party invoke the inference? Presumably the answer would depend on a host of factors specific to each
particular case. Thus instead of abolishing the inference, the proposed rule could have the opposite effect. It would add yet another
condition to be satisfied by a party who seeks to invoke the inference. Second, precluding the inference assumes that, before trial, a
party is always able to identify those adverse witnesses who possess
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potentially beneficial information. But, the importance of a witness
may not become apparent until trial, and the inference allows a
party to use that newly acquired knowledge.
In sum, while there are arguably sound reasons for precluding
the argument or instruction about missing witnesses in civil cases,
the wiser course is to retain some form of inference.
B.

Criminal Cases

In the criminal context, there are potentially stronger criticisms
against the use of the missing witness rule. Two arguments are advanced by those who would prohibit the inference. The first critique
challenges the constitutionality of the missing witness rule as a violation of a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, while the
second is based upon state policies that prohibit the prosecutor
from commenting on a witness' absence.
The constitutional argument, suggested by one recent law review comment,9 2 is derived from two Supreme Court cases, Schmerber v. California9 3 and Griffin v. California.9 4 In Griffin, the Court held
that the prosecution may not comment on a defendant's failure to
take the stand because such comment penalizes the accused for exercising his fifth amendment right to remain silent.9 5 Schmerber is
cited for the proposition that a defendant cannot be compelled to
"provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative
nature." 96 Together, says the commentator, these cases mean that
"any application of the inference rule in criminal cases violates the
fifth amendment.

' 97

The analogy to these cases is that the adverse inference is a
penalty imposed upon a defendant for asserting his privilege not to
provide the state with testimonial evidence from a witness who, presumably, would testify against him. 98 The argument takes its
92. Comment, supra note 22.
93. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
94. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
95. Id. at 613.
96. 384 U.S. at 761. The Court held that the fifth amendment permits the use of a
mandatory blood-alcohol check as evidence against the defendant, since the blood sample readings are physical evidence, rather than testimonial evidence. Id.
97. Comment, supra note 22, at 1435.
98. This reasoning departs from that of the Comment cited supra note 22. In that
Comment, the author begins with the principle that the Constitution is violated if the
state penalizes a defendant for asserting a privilege. She then characterizes the threat of an
adverse comment as a penalty, but never fully develops the second part of the analogy to
explain what privilege is being asserted. That privilege is the right, protected by Schmerber, not to produce evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. But what does
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strongest form when an adverse inference is permitted against a defendant who calls a material witness, but fails to question that witness about a critical issue.9 9 In sum, unless a defendant explains
incriminatingcircumstances by calling and questioning a knowledgeable
witness, he may be penalized with an adverse inference.'
The
analogy is, however, imperfect since the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to the testimonial evidence given by a
witness other than the defendant."0 ' Rather, "the only type of selfincrimination which the fifth amendment protects is testimony elic0 2
ited from the defendant himself, or from his personal records."'
Although the cases speak with one voice on what constitutes
self-incrimination, the lack of any thorough exploration of this result may leave some observers unsatisfied. The courts are not rigorous enough when they fall back on the distinction between
testimony from the defendant and from his witnesses. The crucial
question is left unexamined: Whether the State may compel 0 3 a
that include? Clearly the testimonial and communicative evidence protected by Schmerber does not include evidence from witnesses other than the defendant. The author
moves from this dubious first analogy to a second one: The prosecutor's comment on
the accused's failure to call a witness somehow converts the defendant's conduct into a
self-incriminating statement. "Extracting from the defendant's trial conduct a harmful
communication which the defendant would never voluntarily verbalize is indistinguishable from compeling [sic] him to make an incriminating statement: the defendant is, in
effect, forced to give evidence against himself." Id. at 1437-38. See also Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 124 (1974) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (employing similar reasoning). In fact, however, the difference between the prosecutor's characterization and a
statement uttered by the defendant himself is enormous. When the missing witness inference is invoked, the defendant is not forced to do anything; the prosecutor merely
argues from the facts. If the prosecutor's argument were to be treated as if it somehow
miraculously became transformed into a statement by the defendant, no prosecutor
could ever discuss the issue of intent, since that would be extracting a statement of
mental impressions from a defendant. Clearly, this analysis yields rather absurd
conclusions.
99. Cf. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 493 (1917) (prosecutor may comment on the defendant's failure to explain certain events if the defendant takes the
stand); United States v. Helms, 703 F.2d 759, 765 (4th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that a
court is entitled to infer that a party who, without prejudicing his rights, could contradict
testimony given against him by his own testimony, would not have contradicted that
adverse testimony); People v. Moore, 17 A.D.2d 57, 61-62, 230 N.Y.S.2d 880, 885, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 838 (1962) (prosecutor's failure to cross-examine a witness who would
presumably give favorable testimony for the prosecution and who actually took the stand
entitled the defendant to the same adverse inference as is warranted if the witness had
not been called at all).
100. It is important to recall that the inference is only permissive; no presumption is
established that could shift the burden of proof to the defendant.
101. But see Comment, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Reconciling the Practical with the
Sacrosanct, 18 UCLA L. REV. 157, 174 n.69 (1970).

102. Id. at 175.
103. It is not certain that the Court would be willing to extend its reasoning in Griffin
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defendant to present information that may help the State to convict
him. 104

The arguments on both sides are suggested in Williams v. Florida,' 5 which considered whether a requirement that a defendant
supply notice of an alibi defense and the names of alibi witnesses
before trial violated the privilege against self-incrimination. In upholding the requirement, Justice White argued that the pressures
that cause a defendant to present alibi witnesses arise not from the
state's control of punitive measures but from "the force of historical
fact beyond both his and the State's control and the strength of the
State's case built on these facts. Response to that kind of pressure
by offering evidence or testimony is not compelled self-incrimination transgressing the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."'' 0 6 A
prosecutor's comments on the weaknesses in a defendant's case are
to be expected; that is the essence of argument. If, by reflecting the
relative strength of the State's case, those comments induce the defendant to risk exposing further weaknesses by calling and examining witnesses, he has only himself to blame.
Justice Black asserts the opposing viewpoint in his dissent:
The defendant, under our Constitution, need not do anything at all to defend himself, and certainly he cannot be
required to help convict himself. Rather he has an absolute, unqualified right to compel the State to investigate its
own case, find its own witnesses, prove its own facts, and
convince the jury through its own resources. Throughout
the process the defendant has a fundamental right to remain silent, in effect challenging the State at every point to:
"Prove it!"'° 7
As Justice Black's argument indicates, the question not fully an0

to cover the absent witness situation. One might argue, as Justice Stewart does in his
dissent in Griffin, 380 U.S. at 617, that the compulsion suffered by an accused who must
endure the missing witness inference is not the kind of pressure the fifth amendment
was designed to protect against, since such pressure does not rise to the level of Star
Chamber abuses. Id. at 620.
104. Imaginative counsel might argue that by simply calling a witness and asking her
certain questions, the defendant is necessarily providing information to the State, totally
apart from that information divulged by the witness herself. The substantive content of
the questions alone provides a rich source of data to the State, to say nothing of the tone
in which the questions are asked or the relationship that they establish between defendant and witness.
105. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
106. Id. at 85.
107. Id. at 112. However, Justice Black's critique does not necessarily lead to a total
preclusion of all comment on missing witnesses; his dissent in Williams relies on a distinction between pressures on a defendant before trial, and influences that develop during
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swered is what conduct by the State amounts to compelling selfincrimination.
The second critique of the rule reflects similar considerations,
although it is based upon state policy rather than constitutional interpretation. Minnesota and Rhode Island have adopted a rule
prohibiting a prosecutor from commenting on a defendant's failure
to produce witnesses. In State v. Caron'°8 the defendant was accused
of selling marijuana to narcotics agents who called on him at his
Minnesota farmhouse. Although he took the stand to present an
alibi defense that placed him at a local gas station and liquor store at
the time of the sale, the defendant failed to call several critical alibi
witnesses. The prosecutor's comment in closing argument 0 9 was
found improper on appeal for two reasons: "First, such comment
might suggest to the jury that defendant has some duty to produce witnesses or
that he bears some burden of proof; second, the comment might erroneously suggest to the jury that defendant did not call the witnesses
because he knew their testimony would be unfavorable."' 0
The Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted this rationale in
State v. Jefferson."' There, the defendant was accused of brutally
beating to death the 79-year-old owner of his apartment house.
When the defendant was seized shortly after the murder, his right
hand was very swollen. Police photographs of the hand were introduced at trial. The defendant claimed to have injured his hand at
work earlier in the week, but he introduced no corroborating evidence. In summation, the prosecutor commented: "What I'm sugthe trial. The latter pressures may compel the defendant to present information that
ultimately helps the State convict him, which seems acceptable even to Justice Black.
Any constitutional attack on the missing witness inferences must be founded on
the specific protections of the privilege against self-incrimination. This result is suggested by Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). In Adamson, the Court concluded
that the general due process rights to a fair trial do not protect the defendant from a
prosecutor's comment on the defendant's failure to explain or deny adverse testimony.
Id. at 58.
108. 300 Minn. 123, 218 N.W.2d 197 (1974) (per curiam).
109. "When he went to Arnie's [gas station] he didn't remember if he talked to Arnold Warnke or Mr. Nelson. He stated he would buy all his gas there. Of course, we
haven't seen Mr. Warnke or Mr. Nelson today. Also, he went to the liquor store, of
course, we haven't seen anybody from the liquor store." Id. at 126-27, 218 N.W.2d at
200.
110. Id. at 127, 218 N.W.2d at 200. (emphasis added). See also State v. Tungland, 281
N.W.2d 646, 651 (Minn. 1979) (quoting State v. Caron). Minnesota continues to allow
the rule in civil cases. See, e.g., Springfield Farm Elevator Co. v. Hogeson Constr. Co.,
268 N.W.2d 80, 83 (Minn. 1978)(noting that inference may not be used when witness
equally available to both sides).
111. 116 R.I. 124, 353 A.2d 190 (1976).
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gesting is that there are many people that could say, 'I noticed the
swollen hand before the time of the murder.' We know from the
testimony that he was living with a woman-."' 1 2 The defense objected, and the state supreme court found the comment improper.
In so ruling, it repudiated the "empty chair doctrine" that had gov-3
erned previous cases and it explicitly adopted the Caron rationale."t
It does seem inconsistent that although the defendant bears no
burden and need not present evidence or call witnesses, courts will
allow adverse comment by the prosecutor on the lack of evidence.
Wigmore recognized that the burden of proof issue complicates the
analysis of the inference, but he still supported the inference in
criminal cases, concluding that earlier decisions similar to Caron and
Jefferson were mistaken." 4 For Wigmore, the adverse inference was
justified against a defendant if the prosecution had satisfied its burden of production." 5 He would not have permitted the prosecution
to rely on inferences drawn from the defendant's conduct to prove
its own case. But once the prosecution had presented sufficient affirmative evidence to overcome a defendant's motion for a directed
verdict, the permissive inference was mere overkill, and Wigmore's
16
primary concern vanished."
But the burden of proof is more than just a confusing nuisance,
112. Id. at 136, 353 A.2d at 197.
113. Id. Like Minnesota, Rhode Island has retained the inference in civil cases. See,
e.g., Conlin v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 120 R.I. 1, 6, 384 A.2d 1057, 1060 (1978) (stating

inference but disallowing substitution of inference for evidence in envoking another inference); McAree v. Gerber Products Co., 115 R.I. 243, 258-59 n.6, 342 A.2d 608, 616
n.6 (1975) (recognizing that doctrine should be applied cautiously and requiring party
invoking it to inform judge ahead of time).
114. 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 52, § 2273, at 450. The "risk of an inference from nonproduction" is only a "seeming paradox" that "has misled a few courts to deny that any
inference may be drawn." Id.
115. 9J. WIGMORE, supra note 52, § 2511, at 530.
116. Even accepting Wigmore's primary concerns, his result can be challenged. His
test to determine the propriety of an inference-whether the prosecution could survive a
motion for a directed verdict-does not differentiate adequately between cases when the
inference may or may not help to prove the prosecution's affirmative case. Suppose, for
example, the prosecutor's case against a robbery suspect is based largely on circumstantial evidence. The defense moves for a directed verdict at the close of the prosecutor's
case in chief. The motion is denied because the judge correctly finds that a reasonable
juror might find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense rests without presenting
any witnesses. At this point, we know only that a single reasonable juror could find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. But the gap between that standard and the standard requiring unanimous agreement among twelve different jurors may be too great to bridge without
the inference. That is, the inference may be the deciding factor in establishing the prosecution's case and convicting the defendant, when the only case before the jury is the
State's case. For this reason, the adverse inference may prevent the defendant from
putting the prosecution to its full burden of proof.
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Wigmore notwithstanding. To evaluate the Caron andJefferson holdings, we must understand the relationship between this permissive
inference and the burden of proof.
To say, as Justice Black does in Williams, that "the State itself
must bear the entire burden without any assistance from the defendant, ' " v is only to suggest the beginning of this inquiry. There is
only one way to assure that the outcome of a trial is based solely on
the State's affirmative case. Show the jury nothing but that case.
That happens when the defense rests without calling witnesses or
introducing exhibits. If, as Justice Black suggests, the defendant has
a fundamental right to force the prosecution to meet its burden
squarely,1 8 he has a right not to present a defense, even if the prosecutor offers a prima facie case." 9 This proposition is often embodied in instructions to the jury that "the law never imposes on a
defendant in a criminal case the burden
or duty of calling any wit' 20
nesses or producing any evidence."'
This is not to say that the defendant may avoid the risk of conviction by asserting the right; conviction remains a distinct possibility when he presents no defense. But the same is true when a
defendant decides not to testify. Any assertion of rights may be
risky. The principle that emerges from this analysis is that the risk
should not be increased because a defendant chooses to assert his
right. That would penalize the defendant, and Griffin states that a
defendant may not be penalized for exercising his rights.' 2 ' Extending the reasoning of Griffin leads, then, to this proposition: A
prosecutor may not comment on a defendant's failure to call a witness if the
accused has presented no defense at all. Despite the apparent fairness of
this position, it is not the rule. Although a few cases have found that
the missing witness rule is not applicable when a criminal defendant
calls no witnesses, 22 most cases hold that the prosecutor may com117. 399 U.S. at 112.
118. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
119. See Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92

L. REV. 1187, 1213 n.85 (1979).
120. See 1 E. DEvrr & C. BLADEMAR, supra note 61, § 17.19. That the State may never
impose a burden or duty upon the defendant to produce evidence is another way of
saying the defendant has a right not to defend and may instead rely on weaknesses in the
State's case.
121. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
122. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Navigazione Libera Triestina, S.A., 32
F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1929):
The rule applicable to a party failing to call witnesses exclusively in its control
does not apply to a defendant who introduces no evidence at all. A defendant,
if so advised, may well let the case go to the jury on the weakness of the eviHARV.
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12 3
ment on the lack of any defense.
But this analysis still does not determine whether Caron andJefferson were corrently decided, because in both cases the accused did
offer a defense. An analogy to the defendant's decision whether to
take the stand is illuminating. If the defendant testifies, he waives
his privilege, and the "prohibition against inferences from his failure to testify comes to an end with the ending of the privilege.
Hence, his failure in his testimony to deny or explain the evidence against
him which he might naturally have explained is therefore open to
inference."' 4 Similarly, as soon as the defendant produces some
evidence to support his case, he waives his right not to present a
defense, and the prosecution should be permitted to comment on
the weaknesses in the defendant's case. The jury now knows that
the lack of explanation does not result from the assertion of a right
not to explain; rather, the attempted explanation fails because of its

25

own inherent weaknesses. 1

Caron and Jefferson were incorrectly decided, then, and some
form of the missing witness inference should apply to criminal cases
except those in which the defendant chooses not to present a
26

case. 1

I have discussed the origins of the missing witness rule, described this rule in its present form, and considered arguments for
dence presented by a plaintiff, who has the burden of proof, without being
taken to task for failure to call certain witnesses, or have any adverse inferences
drawn which would not follow from an entire failure to refute the evidence
introduced.
Id. at 210-11. See also State v. Posey, 269 S.C. 500, 503, 238 S.E.2d 176, 177 (1977);
People v. Shannon, 88 Mich. App. 138, 143-45, 276 N.W.2d 546, 548-49 (1979).
123. See Vess, supra note 42, at 46; see alsoJarrett v. Madefari, 67 A.D.2d 396, 408, 415
N.Y.S.2d 644, 651 (1979) (inference available even if defendant's case rests solely on
plaintiff's proofs).
124. 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 52, § 2273, at 451.
125. The instruction that the State imposes no burden or duty on the defendant to
call any witnesses or present any evidence, see supra note 61, invites misunderstanding.
The fact that a defendant has no duty to present any evidence should not be read to
imply that the defendant may avoid presenting a particular piece of evidence (except, of
course, the defendant's own testimony) as part of an attempt to defend himself. Correctly interpreted, the instruction refers to the entire defense, not individual pieces of
evidence. It might be changed to read more accurately as follows:
The jury will always bear in mind that the accused is never required to present a
defense; instead, he may rely on the weaknesses in the State's case. The State always
bears the burden of proving each and every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Cf.supra note 61.

126. My unstated premise here is that it is better to give an accurate instruction than
to do away with a confusing instruction or prohibit counsel from arguing a seemingly
paradoxical position.
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its abolition. It is now time to suggest modifications to the rule that
would alleviate the problems caused by the rule's questionable origins, complex evolution, and seeming impropriety in certain kinds
of cases.
IV.

A

NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE MISSING WITNESS

Trial courts are usually called upon to determine the propriety
of the missing witness inference in two situations: when an opposing counsel objects to a reference made in a closing argument about
an uncalled witness, and when counsel request jury instructions on
the inference. By focusing on these two situations in particular, that
is, on the context in which the inference is invoked, rather than on
the inference itself, criteria for a simpler and more appropriate rule
may be developed.
A.

Argument

Generally, counsel are permitted to argue freely so long as they
avoid blatant appeals to the jury's empathy, sympathy, or prejudice,
and limit their argument to facts in evidence and inferences drawn
from those facts. For the purposes of this analysis, it is the latter
restriction-to facts in the record-that is most significant.
As Wigmore explains, the rule prohibiting argument about
facts not in evidence is based on the same principles that inform the
hearsay rule. The purpose of argument is for counsel to present
factual conclusions that support their client's positions. Those conclusions must be based either on evidence already introduced or on
12 7
facts that are "notorious"- that is, subject to judicial notice.
Any other assertion of fact makes counsel a witness whose testimony
is not subject to cross-examination, and that is contrary to the principle that informs the hearsay rule.' 28 However, Wigmore makes a
special effort to justify comment on a missing document or witness
by explaining how such an omission is "in evidence": "IT]he failure
to produce is in evidence from the very nature of the situation, and
1' 29
therefore, when relevant . . . , may be referred to.'
Wigmore's discussion of the comment on a witness' absence is
ultimately unsatisfactory. To begin, the "failure to produce" is not
necessarily "in evidence" as Wigmore asserts. Instead, the jury may
127. 6

J.

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1806, at 349

boume rev. ed. 1976).
128. Id.
129. Id., § 1807, at 358.

(J. Chad-
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only know that the witness is absent. This is one of many pieces of
data that, by the nature of the proceedings, is already before the
fact-finder but is not admitted as evidence on the record. The most
obvious example of this kind of information is the appearance and
demeanor of a criminal defendant who does not take the stand.
Whether a court is restricting comment about a defendant's appearance, or limiting argument about an absent witness, the court is, in
effect, attempting to remove from the jury's consideration some information that it already possesses. When it considers counsels' use
of such information in closing argument, in essence, the court is ruling

on the admissibility of these obvious facts as evidence.
To be admissible, that evidence must be relevant. Counsel
should not be permitted to allude to a person's failure to appear and
testify unless a foundation for relevance is first laid. The mere absence of a witness is neither related to a party nor relevant to the
truth or falsity of any issue of fact, and should not be subject to
comment. However, an intentional decision not to call a witness
could be relevant to a party's belief in the strength or weakness of
his evidence on a particular issue. This belief in turn reflects on the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of real and documentary evidence. The relevance necessary to justify comment in argument is
supplied, then, by a showing that the absence of a witness is due to a
party's willful decision not to call that witness. Thus, relevance is
conditioned on a question of fact: whether the party could have
produced the witness.' 30 Stating the problem in this way suggests
the test that should be used to determine whether counsel's comments are proper. If the judge finds sufficient evidence of record
that the party could have called the witness, the jury should be permitted to consider the witness' absence and assign to that fact
whatever weight it considers appropriate according to its own findings on the issue of relevance. 131
Of course, the judge may exclude even relevant evidence if that
evidence would prejudice one party, confuse the issues, mislead the
jury, or waste time. Comment about the absence of a material witness, however, is not likely to have an unduly prejudicial or confusing effect on the jury sufficient to warrant its exclusion, so long as
counsel exercises reasonable restraint in calling the jury's attention
to that fact. The inquiry into relevance, then, remains the critical
issue in determining the propriety of the missing witness argument.
130. Thus, the decision to allow an inference is part of the same class of conditional
relevancy problems addressed by FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
131. See FED. R. EviD. 104(b); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 53, at 137.
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Once a fact is in evidence, counsel are permitted to argue inferences from that fact' 3 2 subject only to the duty to exercise good
faith. Thus, counsel should be allowed to argue without interference from- the court, with "the answering argument and the jury's
good sense"'1 3 to serve as corrective measures where
appropriate. 134
B.

Instruction

The formal distinction between argument and instruction is
well recognized. Argument involves counsel's analysis of all of the
evidence, and is not limited to those matters for which a jury instruction is required. Jurors may treat the argument for what it is.
But a jury instruction has the weight of law, even if, in the case of
instruction as to an inference, it only permits and does not require
the inference.1 35 In considering whether to give jury instruction on
an inference, a court must weigh its knowledge that in the absence
36
of instruction a jury will make an unguided natural inference,1
against its knowledge that an inference embodied in an instruction
assumes a greater importance for the jury. As Justice Douglas remarked in Griffin: "What the jury may infer, given no help from the
court is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the
' 37
silence of the accused into evidence against him is another."'
132. See, e.g., Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 125 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he rule that should be laid down is, that, in the absence of express prohibition,
every fact which, in no illegal manner, comes to the knowledge of the jury during the
progress of a trial, and which may influence their minds, is a subject of comment by
counsel in their argument."); see also Note, The Permissible Scope of Summation, 36 COLUM.

L.

REV. 931 (1936).
133. C. McCORMICK, supra note 4, § 272, at 807-08.
134. According to this analysis, Graves was incorrectly decided; the absence of the defendant's wife was clearly relevant to his consciousness of guilt, and the fact that the
defendant could not have called her to testify is not material. The prosecutor did not
call attention to defendant's failure to call his wife, only to her absence from the courtroom. And other evidence showed that she could have attended.
Support for this viewpoint is found in the generally accepted rule that the prosecutor is allowed to comment upon the defendant's conduct in the courtroom. See Vess,
supra note 42, at 42. But see United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1186 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (courtroom behavior not legally relevant to guilt or innocence).
135. Burgess v. United States, 440 F.2d 226, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
136. Cf. Yuen v. State, 43 Md. App. 109, 113, 403 A.2d 819, 823 (1979) (in the absence of instruction, jury is not precluded from inferring).
137. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). It is not clear whether the court
"solemnizes" the conduct of the accused as evidence against him merely by permitting
argument. Burgess implies that this is not the case. Burgess, 440 F.2d at 235. But see
Graves, 150 U.S. at 121 ("permission to make this comment was equivalent to saying to
the jury that it was a circumstance against the accused ....
").
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Courts have shown a similar concern when requested to give a miss38
ing witness instruction.

From the comments above, one might suppose that the best
practice would be not to instruct at all, and in fact this position has
been argued forcefully.' 3 9 However, the sounder view recognizes
that lay jurors need guidance in reaching a just decision. Jurors are
expected to sort through not only the mass of conflicting testimony
and exhibits but also the arguments of counsel. The absence of instructions leaves jurors with their individual conceptions and mis14 0
conceptions of what the applicable law is.
And the need for an instruction becomes even clearer when the
issue is viewed from the perspective of tme jurors at trial. A recent
article calls attention to the fact that jurors form inferences from the
absence of evidence that they had expected to see produced, and
suggests that judges should take such "negative inferences" into account when ruling on the admissibility of evidence.' 4 1 This problem
is fundamental. Jurors are passive; during the course of a trial they
are expected to decide issues based on incomplete evidence, evidence that is in the absolute control of the litigating parties. Naturally, questions will arise in the minds of any people put into such a
situation, and jurors are no exception. Their expectations about
having their questions answered will not always be fulfilled. Nor are
they usually encouraged to ask their questions directly.42 While
this may be understandable and necessary for expeditious trials of
138. See, e.g. United States v. Ferguson, 498 F.2d 1001, 1008 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 900 (1974) (quoting Burgess, 440 F.2d at 234) ("[T]here is a danger that the
instruction permitting an adverse inference may add a fictitious weight to one side or
another of the case.").
139.
There being no reason why this particular inference has a quality distinct from
any other, it should be admitted into or excluded from instructions according
to whether inferences are ever proper material for instructions. It may be repeated that I doubt whether this inference rises to the dignity of either a "rule"
or a presumption. As an inference, it is logical ....
• . . If it commends itself to reason, born of common judgment and experience, the jury will apply it without hint or argument from the Court ...
Those cases are sound which deny to the inference any quality other than mere
argument. Here again a safe and logical test is: if counsel is free to argue it,
the Court is not.
Alexander, supra note 8, at 14.
140. United States v. Young, 463 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Robinson, J.,
concurring).
141. Saltzburg, supra note 119.
142. See 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 784a, at 199-200

(J.

Chadbourne rev. ed. 1970); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3D 872 (1970) (discussing propriety of
jurors questioning witnesses during trial).
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cases, it does not seem necessary to ignore the jurors' frustrations
and leave them without guidance in resolving their uncertainties.
Jurors' uncertainties about missing witnesses should be treated
as one part of a larger set of unresolved questions. The court
should provide guidance by instructing the jury as follows:
Members of the jury: Both sides have now rested their
cases. Even though you may still have questions that remain unanswered, you must now reach a decision. It is
your duty to decide this case by weighing the evidence that
has been presented here, including all the testimony from
witnesses and all the exhibits that have been introduced.
When the relevance of a witness' absence has been established, the
court should continue:
In addition, if you find from the evidence before you that a
party could have called a witness, and yet that witness was
not called, you may infer that the party believed for some
reason that the witness would not be helpful in proving its
case. Common sense will often suggest many reasons why
the absent witness might not help to prove a party's case.
The court might then instruct the jury that certain specific witnesses
could not have appeared, for example, because they are deemed incompetent to testify or because they could not be found when subpoenaed. In this way, the court would, in effect, be ruling that for
those witnesses the inference is not allowed.
V.

TRIALS WITHOUT GRAVES:

WHAT DIFFERENCE WILL IT MAKE?

By adopting the standards proposed here for argument and instruction, courts could avoid the most significant problems with the
current rule. The complexity stemming from the Graves rule is reduced drastically because the court need consider only one simple
question: whether enough evidence has been presented to establish
the relevance of the witness' failure to testify.' 4 3 Since the jury
would make the determination about the significance of a witness'
absence, courts would be released from deciding controversies over
when a witness may elucidate a matter or how to treat a witness who
is equally available to both parties.' 4 4 Also, the proposed rule
143. Even this test might be simplified by a presumption that the party was able to call
the witness, which might be rebutted, for example, by evidence that a subpoena could
not be served. Of course, this would place the burden on the parties to explain why
witnesses are absent, but that is merely expecting lawyers to prepare their cases
thoroughly.
144. This solution is in accord with Wigmore's analysis suggesting that an inference
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would avoid the procedural requirements for advance rulings that
are now imposed in some jurisdictions.
Other criticisms of the current embodiment of the Graves
rule 145 are answered by the suggested reform in jury instruction.
First, the court no longer suggests to the jury an inference that is
exaggerated and possibly untrue. The nature of the proposed inference is understated; it is more natural and accurate. The jury is no
longer permitted explicitly to speculate about the nature of the
missing testimony. Instead, its attention is more appropriately focused on the evidence that has been introduced. The instruction
says, in effect, that all the relevant and useful information is before
the jury. Second, because the content of the instruction is neutral,
the inference is not a covert means of suggesting to the jury how
evidence should be weighed. The proposed rule helps to preserve
the integrity of the jury's independent decision-making power.
Third, the proposed rule removes the incentive for abuse by counsel. The instruction as proposed favors neither side, unlike the current adverse inference rule. Strategic posturings in hopes of
receiving a missing witness instruction should be removed. Counsel
must direct their efforts at eliciting testimony unfavorable to the
other side from witnesses subject to cross-examination, rather than
relying on the possibility of a free ride from a missing witness.
Finally, even some of the theoretical objections to the Graves
rule may be answered by the proposed instruction. The instruction
is neutral, not adverse to the nonproducing party, so that party cannot complain of being "penalized" by the court for its decision not
to call a particular witness. 14 6 And even though counsel could still
argue inferences of guilt or fear of exposure from the failure to produce witnesses, the court would no longer lend explicit support to
those inferences.

47

1

should be permitted against either party for failure to call a witness equally available to
both. See supra note 46.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 41-52.
146. But see Young, 463 F.2d at 943 n.16:
[W]e are not so clear concerning Judge Fahy's distinction which would permit
some comment in counsel's argument on the fact that a witness is missing so
long as he stopped short of saying that an inference could be drawn that the
testimony of the absent witness would be adverse to the other side had he been
called. Whether or not the lawyer explicitly uses the word "inference," when
his comment, as in argument to the jury, emphasizes the fact that the witnesses
were not called by the other party, he is, ordinarily at least, in fact arguing to
the jury that they may conclude that the testimony of these witnesses would be
adverse to the party who failed to call them.
147. One might argue that, by permitting such comments, the court is still penalizing
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But if the proposed instruction-and thus the inference allowed-appears to avoid the difficulties with the present rule, one
may still ask if it achieves a desired result. Will courts sacrifice
something by adopting a new rule? After all, the problems with the
present rule would also vanish if comments were banned altogether
and no instructions were given. The proposed instruction is worthy
of serious consideration precisely because it is able to offer needed
guidance to the jury without introducing unnecessary and misleading elements into their deliberations.
The inferential chain under the current rule can be represented
in this way:
a witness is absent-a party failed to call the witness-that party fears what the witness would say-the testimony would hurt the party.
The recommended rule severs the final link in the chain, which was
the weakest by far, and replaces the third level inference with a conclusion that is less sensational and more accurate. 48 But suppose it
is a fact that the witness' testimony would have been damaging to a
party. Is the restraint in the new instruction then a drawback?
On the contrary. While the language of the new instruction is
understated, the impact is not. The force of the inference is more
clearly tied to the known circumstances presented to the jury, and
the impact of the inference focuses the jury's attention on their task
of weighing the evidence of record rather than on possible speculation about evidence the jury has not seen.
A case will help to illustrate the point. In Seyle v. State,' 49 the
defendant was accused of murdering his 2-year-old stepson. According to the prosecution's evidence, the child's injuries indicated
severe physical abuse. The defendant testified on his own behalf
and claimed that, while he and the child were in the bathroom, the
child had a seizure, fell to the floor unconscious, and received his
fatal injuries. According to the defendant, his wife was present at
counsel for nonproduction and supplying incentive for counsel to call the witness. However, the coercive link between the failure to call a witness and the "penalty" becomes
tenuous since the penalty depends on the acts of the opposing counsel. Furthermore,
counsel need not call the witness to avoid comment-they need only present evidence to
explain their reasons for failing to call the witness.
148. The proposed rule could be diagrammed as follows:
A witness is absent-a party failed to call the witness-the party believes the witness would not be helpful to its case.
149. 584 P.2d 1081 (Wyo. 1978).
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the time and witnessed the entire event. The wife was not called to
testify. The proposed inference, that the defendant believes the
wife would not be helpful in presenting his defense, is quite as damaging as the Graves inference, that his wife would have testified
against the defendant. If the accused is to be believed, his wife
should be helpful. To say that an eyewitness would not help the case
is to cast grave suspicion on the testimony already presented by the
defendant.
On the other hand, in a case like United States v. Young, 150 in
which the defendant failed to call alibi witnesses that he claimed to
have seen at a bar at the time of a shooting elsewhere, the proposed
inference is less damaging to the defense. It is probable that such
an alibi witness might not aid the defense, even assuming the defendant is innocent, because the bar may have been crowded, the
dates and times could be confused, and those witnesses might themselves have criminal records that would subject them to
impeachment.
The impact of the inference on the weight of the evidence will
turn, then, on one question. How helpful might a particular witness
be to a "virtuous" party (for example, an innocent criminal defendant) under the facts and circumstances in evidence? This instruction is
an improvement because it focuses the jury's attention most directly
on the critical variables that should affect their decision.
A different rule, sometimes proposed as an alternative to the
empty-chair doctrine, instructs the jury that it "is entitled, if it
wishes, to give the strongest weight to the evidence already in the
case in favor of the other side and which has not been, but might
have been, effectively contradicted or explained by the absent witnesses."' 15 ' But this instruction poses two problems. First, it is at
least superfluous, because the jury knows already that it can attach
greater weight to one side's evidence if it wishes, and possibly
worse, because it may be interpreted as a suggestion by the judge
that the evidence be weighted in this manner. Second, and more
troublesome, if the jury entertains a reasonable doubt, based on a
criminal defendant's testimony, before the instruction is given and
the judge then instructs that the evidence may be construed most
strongly against the defendant, the instruction to construe the evidence most strongly against the defendant may obliterate the

150. 463 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
151. Seligson, Morris & Neuburger v. Fairbanks Whitney Corp., 22 A.D.2d 625, 630,
257 N.Y.S.2d 706, 710 (1965).
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reasonable doubt standard, by permitting the jurors to disregard
those reasonable doubts arising from the defendant's testimony.
Thus, this attempt to design a better inference rule falls short of the
mark. Certainly, in criminal cases, a charge that the jury should
weigh the evidence differently because of the failure of one party to
call a witness is confusing, at best, and, at worst, challengeable for
interfering with the reasonable doubt standard.
Precedent supports the instruction and inference proposed.
Considering only the federal rule for a moment, it is helpful to remember that the Graves opinion, while much relied upon, is dictum.
In several more recent cases, 5 2 federal courts have cited another
Supreme Court opinion, United States v. DiRe,' 5 3 for support when
they have refused to grant the adverse inference. There, the government failed to call an informer who was in a position to relate
critical details about a conspiracy to counterfeit ration coupons.
The Court, wrote Justice Jackson, "must assume that his testimony
would not have been helpful in bringing guilty knowledge home to
DiRe."' 5 4 The inference that I propose here goes one step further
than DiRe by focusing on the unhelpful nature of the witness rather
than the testimony. This is an improvement, since it recognizes that
factors having little to do with the testimony-for example, a witness' appearance or criminal record-may weigh in a party's decision not to call a witness. And while the precise nature of the
inference may differ, the recommended rule also gathers support
from those state courts that already shy away from the traditional
conclusion that the nature of the testimony from a missing witness
would be unfavorable.
But all precedent does not favor the new rule, and at least one
case directly rejected an instruction very similar to that proposed
here. In Fey v. Walston & Co., Inc. 155 a widow sued her stockbroker
for churning her account. At issue was a power of attorney in favor
of plaintiff's son, which permitted him to trade stocks for her. It was
unclear whether the power applied only to a single transaction, or to
an entire series of trades that the son had initiated. Plaintiff did not
call her son to testify. When the defendant requested the traditional
152. See United States v. Tucker, 552 F.2d 202, 211 (7th Cir. 1977); Burgess, 440 F.2d
at 233. A Maryland court has also cited DiRe approvingly. See Christensen v. State, 21
Md. App. 428, 435, 320 A.2d 276, 279 (1974), rev'don other grounds, 274 Md. 133, 333
A.2d 45 (1975).
153. 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
154. Id. at 593.
155. 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974).
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instruction, the judge modified it, and instructed the jury: "If a
party to this case has not produced a witness within his power to
produce, you may infer that the testimony of the witness would be of
no aid to that party . . ,.56
The Seventh Circuit reversed on appeal, reasoning that
[a]s given, the instruction could have been more prejudicial
than failure to give any instruction at all on the subject,
since in one of its possible interpretations it could have
reassured jurors wondering about plaintiffs failure to call
the son that his testimony would have been merely "of no
aid" although not necessarily adverse to plaintiff's case in
view of the sufficiency of plaintiffs other evidence. Any
such interpretation would have been accentuated by another instruction in which the court told the jury that the
law does not require any party to call as witnesses all persons who may have been present at any time or place involved in the case, or who may appear to have some
knowledge of the matters in issue at this trial ....
This reasoning is worthy of careful scrutiny, because it illustrates the intimate connection between the instruction and the underlying inference. The appellate court rejects the instruction
because that tribunal assumes (1) that a party is entitled to have the
jury infer that the potential testimony would be unfavorable, and (2)
that this moderate instruction may prevent the jury from thus
"properly" evaluating the absence of a witness. The instruction is
adjudged prejudicial because it may preclude the adverse inference.
For our purposes, the court begs the question-what is the
proper nature of the inference, and hence the appropriate content
of the instruction-by assuming that the inference about a witness's
adverse testimony is proper, without ever addressing the issue.
Thus, the most that can be said for Fey is that it stands for the proposition that as long as we accept the traditional inference, we must
retain the traditional instruction; one cannot be changed without
changing the other. But because the court fails to consider the critical issue on the merits, Fey does not present a serious obstacle to the
ideas and proposals advocated here.
CONCLUSION

The empty chair now speaks too eloquently, and it is time to
156. Id. at 1053 n.20.
157. Id. at 1053.
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discard the inference that gives it such a powerful voice. The current doctrine is too complex to administer, too easy to abuse, and
too common to ignore. In its place, courts should substitute a rule
that allows greater latitude to counsel in their argument, so long as
a simple condition is fulfilled, and instructions that provide more
accurate guidance and more understandable direction to jurors.
Surely, it is not a simple matter to reconsider a rule as venerable as
the Graves doctrine. But neither can we allow tradition to substitute
for diligent inquiry. The vitality of our trial courts depends on our
willingness to reconsider and react.

